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What Hath Raich Wrought? Five Takes
Glenn H. Reynolds1 & Brannon P. Denning2
Introduction
Gonzales v. Raich, coming as it does at the end of both Justice O’Connor and Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s tenure on the Court, provides an opportunity to reflect on the Rehnquist
Court’s apparent run at establishing a judicially-enforceable federalism. We say “apparent,”
because we wonder below whether there wasn’t less to this than met the eye.
Two of the most visible symbols of this effort were the decisions in United States v.
Lopez and United States v. Morrison, in which the Court twice struck down acts of Congress as
beyond the scope of its commerce power. Now, nearly ten years after Lopez and five years after
Morrison, Raich leaves many wondering whether the Court provided an answer to John Nagle’s
question whether Lopez was destined to be a watershed or a “but see cite.”3
Below, we offer our impressionistic answer(s) to the question we pose in the title. In
doing so, we move from the practical impact of Raich (i.e., what does this mean for as-applied
challenges to which lower courts were becoming receptive?) to more abstract ones (e.g., does
Raich represent the third death of federalism, or was the Rehnquist Court’s federalism project an
illusion?). Needless to say, it will take time to assess definitely the impact of Raich, so we offer
the following takes fully aware of their tentative nature, notwithstanding the stirring imagery of
headless zombies in which it is wrapped.4
Take One: The End of As-Applied Challenges
There was irony in the timing of Raich. Examining lower court decisions after Lopez but
before Morrison, then again in the years immediately after Morrison, we criticized the lower
courts for not taking the Court seriously, even after Morrison appeared to confirm that Lopez was
not a fluke.5 Recently, however, lower courts seemed to be taking the hint, sustaining as1
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applied challenges to several federal criminal statutes.
For example, in 2003 the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of a woman for
possession of child pornography.6 The woman, who had a host of substance abuse and mental
health problems, was in possession of photographs showing her and her ten-year old daughter
posed together “with their genital areas exposed.”7 When photo shop employees developing the
pictures notified authorities, McCoy was charged with and plead guilty to possession of child
pornography under the federal statute, based on the fact that the picture was produced “using
materials which have been mailed or . . . shipped or transported” in interstate or foreign
commerce.8
Applying the factors set out in Lopez and Morrison, Judge Stephen Reinhardt set aside
McCoy’s guilty plea. He noted that the mere possession here was not “economic activity”; the
relationship between the commercial child pornography industry and McCoy’s conduct was
“highly attenuated at best”; there was little tying the activity to “a discrete set of cases that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce;” and the legislative history did not “support the
conclusion that purely intrastate ‘home-grown’ possession has a substantial connection to
interstate trafficking in commercial child pornography.”9
While paying homage to Judge Reinhardt’s “well-articulated opinion,” Judge Trott
refused to accept its conclusions.10 “Congress has declared that an entire class of activities
substantially affects interstate commerce,” wrote Judge Trott.11 “That activity is child
pornography.”12 Thus, “the factual non-commercial nature of a single item of the commodity is
immaterial.”13
Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the
Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came? 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 369.
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Similarly, in United States v. Stewart,14 Judge Alex Kozinski, writing for another panel of
the Ninth Circuit, reversed the conviction of a man charged with possession of machine guns,
which he had manufactured himself.15 As in McCoy, Kozinski followed Lopez and Morrison to
the letter. He concluded that mere possession of a machine gun was not “economic” activity.16
Further, Kozinski found “the effect of Stewart’s possession of homemade machine guns on
interstate commerce” to be attenuated.17 The statute had “no jurisdictional element anchoring the
prohibited activity to interstate commerce,”18 and none of the findings accompanying the ban on
machine gun possession “speaks to any relationship between mere possession of firearms and
interstate commerce.”19 The findings, Judge Kozinski continued, “focus primarily on the need
for federal enforcement where firearms cross state and international borders, and are thus
difficult for individual states to regulate on their own.”20
As in McCoy, not every member of the panel was convinced. Judge Restani, sitting by
designation, dissented, writing that “[p]ossession of machine guns, home manufactured or not,
substantially interferes with Congress’s long standing attempts to control the interstate movement
of machine guns by proscribing transfer and possession.”21 Since Congress had chosen to
regulate the demand for machine guns by eliminating the market in them, it could reach local,
noncommercial possession, such as Stewart’s.22
In light of Raich, Judge Trott and Restani proved to be the better prophets.23 But Judges
Reinhardt and Kozinski—far from embarking on some wild frolic and detour—were merely
taking the Court at its word, and trying to apply the factors as the Court had articulated them.
One could forgive them if they feel somewhat ill-used by a Court that cannot make up its mind.
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Whatever the effects of Raich on lower courts (a point to which we return below), one thing is
clear: the as-applied challenges to which lower courts had been warming are likely over. In both
Stewart and McCoy, the correct outcome after Raich seems clear: if Congress can eliminate the
interstate market in machine guns or child pornography, any manifestations of that activity, no
matter how local, or how non-commercial, is within its reach (unless Congress chooses to
exempt local activities).
Take Two: The Emily Litella Court
“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”24 That was the statement in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey with which the Supreme Court responded to critics of its abortion
jurisprudence. Even if the Court’s framework were flawed, its essential holding had to be
preserved, lest people lose confidence in the Court, and see its decisions as subject to shifting
political winds.25
Yet, in Raich the Supreme Court has been quite ready to abandon previous lines of
jurisprudence without much concern for how it will affect its credibility. That’s unfortunate,
because the Court’s backpedaling on the Commerce Clause is likely to have dramatic and
damaging consequences for the Court’s authority with the audience that watches it most closely,
the lower federal courts.
On more than one high-profile subject this term, the Court has been reminiscent of the
elderly and hard-of-hearing Saturday Night Live character Emily Litella, who would make
attention-getting pronouncements and then, after some confusion, retreat with the trademark
phrase: “Never mind!” With its step back from the property rights cases in Kelo,26 and its retreat
on the Commerce Clause in Raich, the Court invites people to take its future departures from
settled law less seriously, since they can now be forgiven for wondering whether the Court might,
at some future date, reverse itself and exclaim “Never mind!”27
Among those people are the judges of the federal district courts and courts of appeal.28
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As we have noted in previous works,29 those courts seem less responsive to Supreme Court
guidance – except when it steers them in directions that they, for institutional reasons, already
want to go – than to their own institutional concerns. The classic model of judicial hierarchy, in
which the Supreme Court announces general principles that are then faithfully applied by the
lower courts, no longer holds, if it ever did.30
In arriving at that conclusion, we examined the way in which lower courts applied the
decisions in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison.
The initial installment of our project, published in the Wisconsin Law Review in 2000,
was subtitled "What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?"
There, we concluded that lower courts seemed strangely slow to respond to the Lopez decision,
but suggested that Supreme Court clarification might improve matters.31
A couple of years later, we authored the next installment of our survey. Unfortunately,
we found that lower courts were, in fact, doing little to put Lopez'
s reasoning into effect.
Examining the large number of lower-court cases addressing Commerce Clause issues, we found
ample evidence of a desk-clearing mentality at work. We concluded:
But if ideology is not the source of lower court resistance-or, if any sustained
inquiry is likely to result in the old Scots verdict, "not proven"- is there an
explanation for lower courts'behavior? Research by other scholars suggests that
the problem here, to paraphrase former presidential candidate Michael Dukakis, is
not ideology, but rather competence. What we are seeing in lower courts'
Commerce Clause decisions may be only symptomatic of a larger problem in the
federal judiciary: that of courts responding to an increasingly unmanageable
caseload by resorting to corner-cutting, resulting in an overall reduction in the
quality of courts'work product.32
New law from the Supreme Court, especially new law that might create more burdens for
overworked judges, was getting short shrift. Nonetheless, there were signs that the lower courts
were beginning to take the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence seriously.33 It seems
unlikely, however, that this will continue post-Raich,34 and that raises some questions as to the
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Supreme Court’s role in the future.
As a practical matter, of course, Supreme Court control over the lower courts has been
notional for some time. Lower court caseloads have been exploding, while the Supreme Court is
actually hearing fewer cases than it did decades ago. But the Supreme Court’s power has always
stemmed more from example than from its ability to directly overturn lower courts. Yet the more
unclear, and hesitant, the Supreme Court seems, the less likely it is that lower courts will follow
its lead.
That poses rather serious problems for the justice system. The legitimacy of lower
courts’ rulings, after all, stems largely from the notion that they are supervised by higher courts.
In the absence of such supervision, decisions at the Court of Appeal level are, if they are both
effectively unreviewable (or at least unreviewed) and not really guided by principles from above,
simply ad hoc judgments by those who happen to have gotten hold of the case, not much
different from the decisions of faceless bureaucrats in the Executive Branch. With the exception,
perhaps, that those faceless bureaucrats are under the authority of elected officials, the President
(and, to some extent, to Congress), and hence subject to more public scrutiny, and supervision,
than the courts.
A system of ad hoc decisions guided more by institutional expediency and personal
preference than by overarching principle may or may not be a bad thing, but it is not a system of
justice as we know it. Yet the Supreme Court’s retreats this term, coupled with its self-imposed
caseload reductions in recent years, suggest that the Court is less concerned than it should be
with its role in overseeing the lower courts.
Though simple politics probably provide a great deal of explanation for the phenomenon
of increased acrimony over Court of Appeals nominations, it is worth noting that the less
supervision the Supreme Court affords lower courts, the more significant Congressional
oversight, and particularly Senate scrutiny of lower court appointments, becomes. And although
much of the increased scrutiny given to Court of Appeals candidates can be explained by the
presence of well-heeled interest groups with money to spend, and a desire for attention in the
media, there may be more going on than that. When federal appellate judges were seen as dutiful
followers of Supreme Court precedent, it made sense to pay less attention to them, and to focus
on the Supreme Court. But with the Supreme Court deciding fewer cases, and with the Courts of
Appeal seen (correctly) as far more independent, it is only natural for people to pay more
attention to their staffing.
Such scrutiny, however, is a poor substitute for traditional appellate oversight. It’s
possible that turnover in the Supreme Court (the current Court, like Emily Litella herself, can be
fairly characterized as both old and hard-of-hearing, even by Supreme Court standards) will
reinvigorate its institutional role. The Court, especially if its membership becomes both younger
and more vigorous, could easily return to its earlier caseloads, which would allow it to provide a
greater degree of supervision, and perhaps encourage it to state its own positions more clearly
and firmly. To the extent, of course, that the Court’s lack of clarity stems from simple disunity,
new appointments will only make a difference if they produce a court that is more closely aligned
on important issues than today’s court; it is impossible to say, at this point, whether that is likely.
(Nor is it clear that even a Supreme Court composed largely of Bush appointees would
necessarily treat federalism more seriously.)
6

Still if, as Larry Solum has asserted, “a results-oriented, closely-divided court poses grave
dangers for the rule of law,”35 then any change in the Supreme Court’s makeup that would make
it less closely divided (or, ideally, less result-oriented) would be an improvement over a situation
in which idiosyncratic vote-counting is the preferred method of predicting Supreme Court
decisions, as it certainly has been in recent years. This suggests that a highly contested
appointment process, in which nominees have strategic reasons to either conceal their ideology,
or to have no consistent legal position in reality, is unfortunate for the rule of law, and likely to
undermine the position of the judiciary over time.
On the other hand, some may feel that a weaker Supreme Court – and, for that matter, a
weaker judiciary generally – is actually a good thing, giving primacy to the political branches and
hence undermining concerns about the “countermajoritarian difficulty.”36 While judicial
unpredictability and inconsistency may be unfortunate, the result – a sort of judicial anarchy –
may be preferable to the judicial tyranny that some – such as Robert Bork – have been
proclaiming for years.
We, however, are inclined to disagree. The judiciary is supposed to be about principle,
not politics; at most, principle is supposed to be tempered by politics, not the other way around.
The current situation has produced a politicized yet incoherent judiciary that is effective on
neither level. Both of us have suggested reforms to the confirmation process,37 and we suggest
that the Emily Litella court is further evidence that something needs to be done.
We are not prepared to go as far as Richard Davis, who has proposed that Supreme Court
justices be elected for a single 18-year term.38 (Indeed, if we were to go to judicial elections, it
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might make more sense to elect Court of Appeals judges, given their current role. But such a
move seems like overkill). Still, such proposals should serve as a warning that an Emily Litella
Court is unlikely to sustain the kind of public regard that the Supreme Court has come to expect.
Take Three: The Supreme Court to Congress: “Get Big or Get Out”39
In an article written write after Morrison, Professor Adrian Vermeule challenged the
assumption that judicially-enforced limits on the Commerce Clause would promote decentralized
policymaking.40 Vermeule suggested that, on the contrary, “Commerce Clause review . . . will
promote the centralization of public policy at the national level by providing congressional
coalitions with ex ante incentives to legislative more broadly, and to create national programs
that are more comprehensive, than they would otherwise choose.”41 Vermeule noted that Lopez
and Morrison left untouched the “aggregation” principle of Wickard v. Filburn, as well as the
“national-regulatory scheme” exception borrowed from Hodel v. Indiana.42 The latter, Vermeule
argued, “may allow Congress to regulate intrastate activities that are not themselves commercial
or economic, so long as the regulation is integral to a larger valid scheme of (interstate or
commercial) regulation.”43 Permitting the aggregation of certain activities and regulation of
those activities essential to the furtherance of a national regulatory scheme, Vermeule wrote,
“allow and encourage Congress to ensure the constitutionality of otherwise-suspect provisions by
broadening their scope, or by bundling them into a comprehensive scheme of national economic
regulation. The ex ante effects of the current rules, then, may just as easily promote broader
federal regulation—policy centralization—as retard it.”44
Professor Vermeule’s understanding of both aggregation and the national-regulatoryscheme principles proved to be the Court’s in Raich. In her dissent, Justice O’Connor
complained that the holding of Raich—that if Congress may eliminate the interstate traffic of X,
it may reach all activities included within that general class, regardless how local or how
noncommercial—essentially gutted Lopez and Morrison. “Today’s decision,” she wrote, “allows
Congress to regulate intrastate activity without check, as long as there is some implication by
legislative design that regulating intrastate activity is essential (and the Court appears to equate

39
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‘essential’ with ‘necessary’) to the interstate regulatory scheme.”45 If this is true, O’Connor
continued, “then Lopez stands for nothing more than a drafting guide” because Congress could
merely have passed a larger regulatory scheme prohibiting the transfer or possession of firearms
anywhere, and regulated the possession near a school zone as an incident to that larger scheme.46
It remains to be seen whether, in fact, Raich will influence Congress to legislate more
broadly in order to avoid constitutional difficulties.47 However, we feel confident predicting that
Raich’s elaboration of the national-regulatory-scheme principle will invite lower courts to
characterize existing statutes that had previously been thought vulnerable to Commerce Clause
challenges as parts of national regulatory schemes, and hold that Congress may reach all local,
noncommercial activity within their classes.48
But if Lopez and Morrison contained seeds of their own undoing that flowered so
soon—little more than a decade later, in fact—that raises the question whether the restraints on
the commerce power (and perhaps the federalism project generally) were more shadow than
substance. We consider this below.
Take Four: The Return (?) of the Necessary and Proper Clause
Raich did make explicit what had largely gone unsaid in cases involving congressional
power in general, and cases involving the commerce power in particular: the degree to which
much of what we take for granted in articulating the scope of Congress’s power depends not so
much on the scope of the power “to regulate commerce . . . among the several States,” but rather
on those implied powers that are “Necessary and Proper” to regulating commerce.49 But
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For specific examples of “as applied” challenges sustained prior to Raich that would
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See Boris I. Bittker, Bittker on the Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce §
5.01[B], at 5-7 (noting that “the Supreme Court has long interpreted the Commerce Clause as a
grant of power to Congress to regulate a state’s ‘internal commerce,’ sometimes labeled
‘intrastate commerce,’ if it has a sufficiently substantial effect on ‘commerce among the several
states’” and that “[s]ometimes the Court has cited the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . but
usually the authority is treated as self evident”); see also Garcia v. San Antonia Metro Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 583-86 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting the connection between
congressional authority of intrastate commerce and the Necessary and Proper Clause); The
Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1917) (upholding federal power to regulate local state
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members of the Raich Court differed as to (1) what, precisely, the Necessary and Proper Clause
required Congress to demonstrate when using it in combination with the Commerce Clause to
expand power, and (2) how deferential the Court need be to those congressional
demonstrations.50
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall noted that the “necessary and proper”
clause granted extensive, but not unlimited, powers to Congress:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.51
Marshall’s famous statement might seem to be a test: In deciding whether a
Congressional action under its necessary and proper powers is constitutional, we might ask: Is
the end legitimate? Is it within the scope of the Constitution? Is it not prohibited? Is it
consistent with (a) the letter, and (b) the spirit of the Constitution? And only if all of these
questions are answered “yes” would the Congressional action be upheld.
In fact, however, the test doesn’t do much work. Marshall himself, of course, largely
abandoned the question of “necessity,” and it has gotten little attention from courts since. By the
time we reach Raich, however, the question seems to have been condensed to this:
In assessing the scope of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, we
stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether
respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate

freight rates; federal authority “necessarily embraces the right to control [railroad] operations in
all matters having such a close and substantial relationship to interstate traffic that the control is
essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate service,
and to the maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted . . . .”);
United States v. Coombs, 37 (12 Pet.) 72, 78 (1838) (upholding power of Congress to punish
theft of goods from ship-wrecked vessel on land completely within a single state; invoking
combination of the Commerce Clause with the Necessary and Proper Clause).
50

Bittker, supra note __, at 5-11 to 5-12 (speculating that using the Necessary and Proper
Clause might “serve as a more effective barrier to a rampant Commerce Clause than does the
requirement that local activity must ‘affect’ or ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce if
Congress wishes to regulate them” but doubting whether such a shift would “be perceptibly more
restrictive than the current case law” because “the courts might well ordinarily defer to the
jdugment of Congress in determining whether a disputed legislative measure is ‘necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution’” congressional powers).
51

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
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commerce in fact, but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding.52
One wonders whether the ratifiers would have included the Necessary and Proper Clause had
they foreseen such a shift.
At any rate, though the majority opinion does not apply Marshall’s test to the case before
the court, Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, announces that it is easily satisfied, and Justice
Thomas, in his dissent, concludes that it is not satisfied at all. Neither are we, nor should be
serious watchers of the Court.
There are two ways of looking at the “necessary and proper” clause: As an independent
source of power for Congress, or as an adjunct – relating to means – in serving the ends spelled
out in Congress’s enumerated powers. Marshall, in McCulloch, suggested that it was the latter,
but interpreted things so expansively that it has become, essentially, the former. As a practical
matter, the Court’s treatment of “necessary and proper” parallels its treatment of “public use” in
the takings context: “"when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in
terms well- nigh conclusive."53
Yet this judicial abdication calls the entire notion of enumerated powers – and, for that
matter, the notion of judicial review – into question. If Congress is to be the judge of its own
powers, then there seems little point to an enumeration. And if courts are, as a practical matter,
going to defer to Congress’s own interpretation of the scope of its powers, then their role is likely
to be limited.
As James Madison himself said about the necessary and proper clause: “Whatever
meaning this clause may have, none can be admitted, that would give an unlimited discretion to
Congress.”54 Madison’s intention, however, has not carried the day, nor has the intention of the
Framers generally. As Randy Barnett notes:
One thing we do know about its legislative history is the wording of a clause that
was earlier proposed by Gunning Bedford and rejected by the Committee. The
proposal was that Congress have the power "to legislate in all cases for the general
interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by
the exercise of individual Legislation." In other words, the Convention had before
it an almost completely open-ended grant of power to Congress and rejected it,
without discussion, in favor of the enumeration of particular powers and the

52

Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at ___.

53

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). Seen in this light, the connection between
this term’s Raich and Kelo decisions should be obvious.
54

1 Annals of Cong. 1947 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791), quoted in Randy Barnett, The
Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 183 (2003).
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ancillary Necessary and Proper Clause.55
This is clearly not the view of a majority of today’s Supreme Court. For those of us who
believed that the Supreme Court was showing an increased enthusiasm for enumerated powers
doctrine, that is a disappointment, leavened only by the fact that at least some justices have
acknowledged the issue. But it seems clear that, for the moment at least, judicial review of
Congressional actions under the necessary and proper clause is effectively nonexistent. That is
deeply unfortunate, and likely stems, in part at least, from the Court’s unwillingness to be
charged with “judicial activism.”
The power of judicial review, through which the Supreme Court may invalidate laws that
are beyond Congress'
s power to enact, is a fundamental part of our constitutional scheme; its
proper exercise is not judicial "activism" but a judicial duty. When the Court strikes down laws
that violate the Constitution, it is merely doing what it is charged to do. By contrast, when the
Court invents new grounds for legislative power that are not within the Constitution, it is, by its
deference, actually practicing judicial activism.
As James Madison himself said about the provisions of the Bill of Rights, "If they are
incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power in the legislative or executive.”56 This bulwark, whether impenetrable or
not, is clearly narrow, as the Court seems unwilling to review “assumptions of power” that do not
pose a conflict with explicit Constitutional restrictions.
These are hardly new questions; but Raich again demonstrated that they can be
fundamental ones. We hope that Raich, at least, will make litigants, judges, scholars, and
members of Congress focus on the Necessary and Proper Clause and its relationship to
Congress’s enumerated powers. With the demise of the doctrine of enumerated powers as a
restraint on federal power, the only protection remaining for the liberties of citizens not sheltered
by powerful lobbying groups is that provided by the positive limitations on government
embodied in the Bill of Rights. Those provisions were inserted by pessimists who did not
believe-- rightly, as it turns out--that the doctrine of enumerated powers would be enough to
restrain the federal government over the long term. There is no reason to believe, however, that
the Bill of Rights itself will survive over the long term if the rest of the plan is abandoned. As
National Aeronautics and Space Administration engineers say, once you start relying on the
backup systems, you are already in trouble. But that is where we are today.
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Barnett, supra note __, at 184. See also Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
"Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43
Duke L.J. 267, 286-89 (1993).
56

James Madison, The Papers of James Madison, vol. 12, ed. Charles Hobson and Robert
Rutland (Charlottesville: Univer sity Press of Virginia, 1989), pp. 206-7.
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Take Five: Is Raich the “Third Death of Federalism?”57
or Was Lopez Merely “Zombie Federalism”?
Early on, Lopez appeared to signify that reinvigoration of a judicially-enforced federalism
was the principal project of what Professor Merrill has coined the “second Rehnquist Court.”58
Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared to make good on his prior expression of confidence that
federalism “will . . . in time command the support of a majority of this Court.”59 The evidence
was certainly there: requiring Congress to make “clear statement” was designed to protect
federalism interests,60 as was articulation of the “anti-commandeering” principle. These were
followed not only by Lopez, but also by the expansion of sovereign immunity beginning with
Seminole Tribe v. Florida,61 the limitation of congressional power under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment,62 extension of the anti-commandeering principle in United States v.
Printz, and, finally, by invoking the Commerce Clause for the second time in five years to
invalidate an Act of Congress.63 The combined effect of these cases led one federal judge to
complain that the Court was “narrowing the nation’s power”; that the Court had “side[d] with the
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Analysis, 47 St. Louis U. L. Rev. 569 (2003).
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(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Then-Justice Rehnquist’s refusal to be reconciled to the
(temporary) triumph of the process federalism of the majority and promise to fight on always
reminded us of Malvolio’s promise to have his revenge at the end of Shakespeare’s Twelfth
Night. See Twelfth Night, act V, scene 1 (Malvolio promising that “I’ll be revenged on the
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517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that
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For an argument that there is much less to sovereign immunity than meets the eye, see Jesse H.
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states” against federal power.64
The near-hysteria expressed by some academics at the Court’s tentative steps toward
judicial enforcement of federalism principles obscured a good deal that should have given
comfort to those who heard in the opinions of the Federalism Five the hoofbeats of the New
Deal’s famously obstructionist “Four Horsemen.” First, there were a number of cases decided
contemporaneously with those whose holdings were in tension with the federalism cases, and the
Court never seemed (as Raich graphically demonstrates) to be able to follow earlier cases to their
logical conclusions. Second, when examined closely, many of the “restraints” imposed on
Congress by the Court’s federalism decisions proved to be rather mild fetters, easily
circumvented.
In this section we attempt a retrospective (if panoramic) view of these dissonant notes in
the Rehnquist Court’s federalism project. Future historians might consider whether there was, at
last, anything for the Raich Court to kill off—if, in fact, Raich represents a retreat.
1. The Spending Power—Many hoped that the Court would follow up Lopez by
elaborating the limits on Congress’s power to impose conditional restrictions on money
appropriated to states, thus enabling it to regulate indirectly what it could not regulate directly.65
In Sabri v. United States,66 however, the Court declined the opportunity, upholding Congress’s
power to criminalize bribery of a state official concerning a state program that received some
federal money, despite the lack of any connection between the federal money and the bribe
itself.67 While there were some procedural issues that made the issues in Sabri less clean than
they might have been, nothing in the case indicated any appetite to strengthen Dole’s rather
flaccid constraints on conditional spending requirements, much less revisit larger constitutional
questions such as whether Congress can spend “for the general welfare” or only in connection
with one of its Article I, section 8 enumerated powers.
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John T. Noonan, Narrowing the Nation’s Power: The Supreme Court Sides with the
States (2002). For critical reviews, see David P. Currie, Inflating the Nation’s Power, 71 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1229 (2004) (book review); Brannon P. Denning, Judge Noonan’s J’Accuse . . . !, 34
Cumb. L. Rev. 477 (2003-2004) (book review); Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the
Federal Government? Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81
Tex. L. Rev. 1551 (2003) (book review). For a more favorable review, see Carl Tobias,
Unmasking Federalism, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1833 (2003) (book review).
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See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 Colum. L.
Rev. 1911 (1995).
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124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004).

For a critical commentary on the decision, see Gary Lawson, Making a Federal Case
Out of It: Sabri v. United States and the Constitution of Leviathan, 2003-2004 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev.
119; see also Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal
Criminal Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2003) (urging the Court to reverse the lower court decision
upholding Sabri’s indictment).
14

2. Preemption—Court critics made great sport of contrasting several of the Court’s recent
cases in which state power was deemed to have been preempted by federal law with cases like
Morrison or Seminole Tribe. Indeed, the Court—including members of the Federalism
Five—has shown real appetite for applying implied preemption doctrines liberally, even to the
point of limiting or extinguishing state common law tort claims,68 despite the Court’s previous
admonition that preemption of statutes reflecting an exercise of a state’s traditional police powers
required a clear statement of congressional intent to do so.69 The erosion of the “presumption
against preemption” has been particularly noticeable in cases involving state regulations that
have international implications. Recently, in fact, the Court held that a mere presidential policy
statement that Holocaust survivors and their heirs should settle claims outside of the judicial
system and through a system established by executive agreement was sufficient to preempt a state
law requiring merely that insurance companies disclose their involvement in insurance sales prior
to the Holocaust as a condition of doing business in the state.70 This despite the fact that the
executive agreement establishing the compensation fund disclaimed any preemptive intent and
the fact that Congress had both acknowledged that states were legislating in this area and had,
years before, left the regulation of the insurance industry to the states.
3. The Anti-Commandeering Principle—In the wake of New York v. United States and
Printz, there were questions about the extent to which the so-called “anti-commandeering
principle” operated. After all, preemption itself, as Mark Tushnet has argued, constitutes a type
of commandeering, since it “commands” the states and their officials not to engage in particular
types of conduct, and may require the expenditure of resources to comply with the federal
regime.71 South Carolina might therefore have been forgiven for thinking that it had a winner
when it challenged a federal statute prohibiting any person or state from selling drivers licence
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American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 825 (2004).
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data.72 The Court thought otherwise. In a unanimous opinion, it drew a distinction between
mandates from the federal government that required affirmative action on the part of states and
their officials and preemption, which, it noted, not only required mere forbearance on the state’s
part but was also rooted in the text of the Supremacy Clause itself.73 Since the Act in question
was a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, the Court held, it was binding on the states.
4. The Commerce Power—Soon after Lopez was decided, the Court decided United
States v. Robertson, which raised the question whether a local Alaska gold mine’s operations
“substantially affected” interstate commerce for purposes of the RICO statute.74 In a per curiam
opinion, the Court concluded that because the mine purchased out-of-state equipment and
supplies, it was engaged in interstate commerce for purposes of that statute, and did not reach the
substantial effects question.75 For some commentators Robertson signaled Lopez was likely a
limited decision.76 Had Lopez been a truly tranformative opinion, one might have expected the
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some Court watchers initially predicted”) (footnote omitted); Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional
Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 167, 176 & n.48 (1996) (asking
whether “we are about to enter an age in which there are extensive limits on the ability of the
federal government to enact criminal law statutes?” and answering “Perhaps not” in light of
Robertson); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 S. Ct. Rev.
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Stephen R. McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to Congressional Power Under
the Commerce Clause? 44 U. Kan. L. Rev. 217, 219 n.20 (1996) (noting that, in light of
Robertson, “pronouncements that Lopez signals a radical departure from precedent and a new era
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence are at this time unwarranted and vastly overblown”); Deborah
Jones Merritt, Commerce! 94 Mich. L. Rev. 674, 733 (1995) (arguing that “Robertson, in sum,
confirms that the Court does not intend an imminent, draconian reversal of its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence with Lopez.”)
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Court to hear more Commerce Clause cases, much as it did when expanding the scope of
sovereign immunity. The Court didn’t lack for attractive candidates, but it either refused to grant
certiorari,77 dodged the constitutional question,78 or affirmed the power of Congress.79 With the
benefit of hindsight, it is Lopez and Morrison, not Raich, that look like the outliers.80
5. The Scope of Congressional Power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
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Dole to Birmingham Board of Education, in The Rehnquist Legacy (Craig Bradley ed.,
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Amendment—Another of Rehnquist Court critics’ bete noires81 was the limitation imposed by the
Court on congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Announced unanimously
in Boerne v. Flores, that Court’s “proportionality and congruence” test combined with the
Court’s robust sovereign immunity jurisprudence to curb congressional efforts to subject states to
liability for damages under federal civil rights statutes.82 In 2003, however, the Court pulled
back, voting 6-3 to uphold provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act.83 Suzanna Sherry
has persuasively argued that Hibbs is not consistent with what the Court’s prior cases in this area
hold, and that the Court “unmade” precedent in order to reach the result it desired.84
When one focuses on the sweep of the Court’s cases (especially within the last five
years), as opposed to focusing on particular decisions, Judge Noonan’s claim that the Court had
“sided with the states” seems melodramatic. In fact, it seems as if the Court’s moves towards
federalism were merely dissonant notes in an overwhelmingly nationalist melody.85 That was the
thesis of Robert Nagel’s The Implosion of American Federalism, a book that, when it was
written, decidedly heterodox.
Nagel argued that whatever moves the Court was making in the name of “federalism” or
“state’s rights” were overshadowed—particularly in its decisions under the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment—by a consistent and relentless nationalization that began sixty years ago
and continued largely unabated. He concluded that even ostensibly “state’s rights” or “federalist”
justices actually offered a relatively tepid federalism, that “radical federalism” was unlikely, and
that the Court’s program of “radical nationalism,” particularly in civil liberties areas was likely to
continue unabated. What seemed somewhat peevish dissent from the conventional wisdom at
the time, after Raich, looks prescient.
Looking at the case law as a whole, we wonder whether there was enough life left in
judicially-enforceable federalism for Raich to kill. In retrospect, it seems the Rehnquist Court
conjured a zombie federalism that wandered aimlessly for a while, killing off the occasional
federal statute drafted with no thought as to constitutionality (akin to the usual horror-movie
zombie victims who wander away from the group), but which, in the end, was pretty easy to kill
itself without even the aid of a shotgun-wielding action hero.
Conclusion
The jury was out on whether Lopez and Morrison marked the repudiation of the near-
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toothless “process federalism” of Garcia. But now the jury has returned, and its verdict appears
unfavorable. Barring a major, and unlikely, shift of the Court’s composition, we now doubt that
a robust judicially-enforceable federalism has much future left. We are unlikely to see a lower
federal court, after Raich, strike down an act of Congress on Commerce Clause grounds, or even
take the more modest step of upholding an as-applied challenge to a federal law. More troubling
is that lower court judges may be even slower, after Raich, to implement Supreme Court
decisions that the Court is firmly behind. Federal judges, like Judge Kozinski, faithfully and
conscientiously applied the Court’s Lopez and Morrison instructions only to have the Court pull
the rug out from under them, vacating their decisions following Raich.86 John Roberts criticized
his colleagues for not squarely facing the questions raised about the Endangered Species Act by
Lopez and Morrison,87 and finds himself portrayed as an “extremist.”88 This unpredictability
cannot be good for the Court as an institution, and will not do much to inspire confidence in it
among lower courts.
Finally, and most distressing, is the possibility that Raich announces a return to the days
in which the Bill of Rights is the only judicially-enforced limit on the power of the federal
government. The Court nascent attempt, pre-Raich, to find some limit to the legislative power of
Congress might have been confusing, it might have been messy, reasonable people could differ
on where to draw the line, but it was at least an attempt to give substance to Chief Justice
Marshall’s truism that enumerated powers presumed something not enumerated. It is also is
worth remembering that lines of doctrine in the area of civil liberties (think state action, or the
Establishment Clause) are not without their problems either, yet no one has seriously suggested
that the Court simply leave it to Congress or to the states to ascertain the scope of their own
power vis-a-vis these provisions.
Perhaps we are too pessimistic. Raich did not overrule Lopez and Morrison. The anticommandeering principle remains. And Raich could renew an important conversation over the
scope and meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause and its relationship with the other powers
of Congress. It is also possible that in a case presenting a less politically-charged topic than
medical marijuana the Court will return to its project of policing at least an outer limit to the
powers of Congress.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s action in Raich (and in the other instances of
backpedaling we mention) will make it much harder for a future Court to exercise influence over
the lower courts, except to the extent that it is steering them in directions that they, for
institutional reasons, already desire to go. And that may offer a lesson as well. Chief Justice
Rehnquist was as strong, and as ideologically settled, as any Chief Justice in recent memory.
Nonetheless, his ability to move the Supreme Court – or the courts as a whole – in the direction
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of his agenda was extremely limited. Administrative agencies have been famously condemned as
a “headless fourth branch” of government.89 It is beginning to seem as if the third branch is more
or less headless as well.
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